(Un-)veiling the west : Burkini-gate, Princess Hijab and dressing as struggle for postsecular integration by Berg, Linda & Lundahl, Mikela
Repositorium für die Geschlechterforschung
(Un-)veiling the west : Burkini-gate, Princess
Hijab and dressing as struggle for postsecular
integration
Berg, Linda; Lundahl, Mikela
2017
https://doi.org/10.25595/1428
Veröffentlichungsversion / published version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Berg, Linda; Lundahl, Mikela: (Un-)veiling the west : Burkini-gate, Princess Hijab and dressing as struggle for
postsecular integration, in: Culture unbound : Journal of current cultural research, Jg. 8 (2017) Nr. 3, 263-283.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25595/1428.
Erstmalig hier erschienen / Initial publication here: https://doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.1683263




Burkini-gate, Princess Hijab and Dressing as 
Struggle for Postsecular Integration
Abstract 
The ban of the burkini in the summer of 2016 in France is the latest stage in a long 
political history, where the French depreciation or fear of the veil, and of Islam, 
has come to play a more significant role since the end of the cold war. Unveiling 
female bodies at the beach in Nice expose conditioned values of the French re-
public. In this context, drawing black veils on public advertisements becomes a 
performative act commenting on consumerism, religion, secularity, and the ima-
gined Muslim woman. In this article we discuss freedom and integration in “third 
spaces” via an analysis of “hijabisation” in street art and the official reactions aga-
inst certain types of beachwear. In line with Talal Asad (2006) we want to raise 
the issue on how the secular state addresses the pain of people who are obliged to 
give up part of their religious identity to become acceptable. Race-thinking was 
once an explicit part of celebrated values like modernity, secularity, democracy 
and human rights. However, the fact that the idea of races has been erased from 
articulations of Western nations and international bodies does not mean that tra-
ces of race-thinking in the heritage from the enlightenment are gone. By following 
Princess Hijab and the “Burkini-gate” a nationalist fantasy intertwined with the 
idea of the secular state reveals itself and acts of un/dressing emerge as signs of 
integration revealing a challenged imperialist paradigm.
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Garment of fear
From 2006 and onwards a graffiti artist called Princess Hijab has been drawing 
black hijabs and niqabs on advertisements in the Paris Metro. It can be seen as a 
form of ad busting in which capitalism and white Eurocentric heteronormativity 
are exposed and commented on through what has been labelled hijabisation.1  By 
using veiling as a symbol of otherness, as something foreign and threatening, this 
work highlights the normalised set of commercialised bodies within public adver-
tising. Princess Hijab is a character presented by an anonymous artist through a 
persona as a veiled young girl.2 The artwork of Princess Hijab garnered internatio-
nal attention in media outlets such as The Guardian, Al Jazeera and The Indepen-
dent. After the burqa-ban in France, the work gained new relevance.
When Nice, along with a number of towns along the French coast, banned the 
use of the burkini as beachwear in the summer of 2016, after the attack in Nice 
where a truck drove into the public who celebrated the 14th of July and killed 86 
people, it was argued that burkinis are upsetting to the public and that the burkini 
is an expression of extreme terrorism. Much of the argumentation for the bans 
was in accordance with the discourse on the war on terror, which has been promi-
nent in France since the attacks in Paris during 2015.
Here we aim to take a closer look on in what respect these two hijabising 
phenomena may effect how Muslim female bodies can inhabit public space in a 
French context.3 What reactions does the everyday use of burkini and street art 
painting on bodies in commercials evoke, relating to the dichotomies religion/
secularity, tradition/modernity and oppression/autonomy? Through postcolonial 
and border thinking, we are deconstructing narratives about the two phenomena, 
in order to destabilize the order of things they are placed in (Anzaldúa 2012; Mig-
nolo 2011; Bhabha 1994; Foucault 1966). Our primary material is media sources 
such as news papers, online archives, interviews, digital galleries, social media and 
blogs about Princess Hijab and what we label as “burkini-gate”, that we analyse as 
scholars grounded in postcolonial, queer, and gender theory (Spivak 1988; Trinh 
1989; Anderson 1991; Butler 2015; Brown 2005), experienced in research on ra-
cism, gender politics and culture. These two different, yet connected, examples in 
a French context, both highlight a challenged secular condition in the post-colo-
nial state. Critique has been directed towards the use of postcolonial theory and 
left legalism in understanding burqa-bans (Fournier 2013), and hence we see the 
importance of rethinking issues with a broader postcolonial perspective (Fournier 
2013:12). We do not tackle this field of study as scholars on the French Muslim 
context but rather, as Afsaneh Najmabadi formulates it, acknowledge the need to 
understand that “the current controversy is in part defined by a historical lega-
cy not of French making alone” (Najmabadi 2006: 240). It therefore needs to be 
addressed as a translocal issue that cannot be explained only from within, since it 
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is the “result from a multitude of circulations and transfers” (Greiner & Sakdapol-
rak 2013: 375). What happens in the French context has its parallels also in other 
European countries, since they all in different senses are home to a growing Euro 
Muslim population (Amer 2014: 97).
Our examples unfold in France, where veiling has been highly debated for a 
long time, and where the most radical measures against it, in the European context, 
have been taken (Fernando 2014). They are both part of an on-going negotiation 
between – and on – the Muslim world and “the West”, even if it all unfolds in the 
actual west, since Muslims are otherized and framed as non-western, and situated 
in what Homi K. Bhabha has labelled a third space or In-Between (Bhabha 1994, 
1996). This in-between can shortly be defined as an ambiguous space where hy-
bridising “identities” can be negotiated and created (Bhabha 1994: 36-39). The 
examples raise wider issues about the right to appear in and the right to be defi-
ned as a legitimate inhabitant of public space (Butler 2015). We saw a connection 
between the two different practices of hijabisation – in street art and what we call 
the burkini gate – which both addressed current crucial concepts such as freedom 
and integration in third spaces. In this article we aim to undertake an analysis of 
them with analytical support from postcolonial, feminist and postsecular theories 
(Butler 2015; Spivak 1988; Mahmood 2001, 2005; Asad 2003; West 1989; Latour 
1993). More specifically we are interested in what we can learn from interventions 
– both everyday actions as the use of burkini and the more intentional covering 
art – that reveal and criticise contemporary secular paradigms, in this case within 
a French context but relevant to other parts of Europe as well (Cady & Hurd 2010; 
Berg, Lundahl, & Martinsson 2016).
In the Western orientalising imagination the veil has remained quite intact 
and is seen as a never changing garment and a symbol of otherness, oppression, 
backwardness and in need of development. But veils and their uses are under-
going immense transformations globally. With growing migration veils become 
present and visible in contexts where they have not been frequent for a long time. 
For scholars it is not a new thing that veils and veiling practices are in constant 
flux and have many and changing meanings (Amer 2014). Nevertheless, the com-
mon discourse tends to homogenise them again and again. There is a tendency 
to accept that veiling is changing and has shifting meanings in Western contexts, 
but not in more “traditional” societies. It reflects a chrono-political thinking (Fa-
bian 2002), where a self-defined “West” imagines itself as contemporary or even 
as belonging to the future, and cultural expressions of the other is placed in an 
imaginary, ahistorical past. The homogenising process continues, and heteroge-
nising stories have to be produced over and over to show other stories. In what 
follows we will contextualise and analyse what veiling do and what reactions it 
causes and in the end we aim to discuss the effects in terms of integration and seg-
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regation that both veiling and counteractions has. Through a short introduction of 
French state secularism and how the burkini became a loaded symbol, we unfold 
the material through two central themes safety and freedom, followed by a call for 
rethinking integration.
In the name of neutrality and unity
In order to understand the layers of France’s relation to hijabising one has to put 
it in the context of secularism and the foundational status it has for the French 
republic, and for Frenchness. It can be traced back to the late 18th century and the 
French revolution, as an ideal of a liberation of public institutions, especially pri-
mary schools, from the influence of the Catholic Church, in line with ideas from 
the enlightenment. French state secularism, laïcité, is defended by the political 
leadership as the foundation of freedom of thought as well as freedom of religion. 
The actual law separating State and Church, however, was not officially adopted 
until December 9, 1905 and reflects the secularist and republican values of France. 
The secular laws of France prohibit the wearing of religious symbols of any natu-
re in schools and certain public buildings. The principle of secularity has been a 
corner stone in the French Constitution, reinforcing state neutrality and guaran-
teeing national unity. It is argued that laïcité is exceptional and foundational for 
France, but secularity is always localised, and in the case of France it is tightly knit 
with the republic and the idea of universalism (Amer 2014: 98; Selby 2012: 70ff).
The principle of secular schools was challenged in 1989, when three young 
Muslim French girls of North African descent, came veiled to their school in Creil, 
a poor suburb north of Paris, and refused to unveil. After first being expelled by 
the director, the girls were finally allowed to attend school on the condition that 
they would not veil inside the classroom (Amer 2014: 97).
While many schools continue to accommodate veiled girls, others pro-
test what they view as a violation of the principle of secularity. Fran-
ce’s highest administrative court, the Conseil d’État, rules that veils are 
compatible with the French separation of church and state. (Rémond 
1999)
The debate on the Islamic veil in the French public sphere has been on-going ever 
since, and on March 15, 2004, a new law meant to reinforce the principle of se-
cularity was adopted, whereby it became forbidden to wear conspicuous religious 
signs in schools (Amer 2014: 94). It’s also been framed in terms of size, where 
religious signs such as a small catholic cross or the star of David are tolerated. This 
has strengthen the suspicion that the law is directed against Islam, rather than 
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being pro-laïcité (Casanova 2007).
In a speech on June 20, 2009, the sitting president Nicolas Sarkozy declared 
that the burqa would not be tolerated in France, not because it’s a religious issue, 
but because it’s questioning the freedom and dignity of women. A law forbidding 
covering of the face in public was passed by the French Senate in September 2010 
and came into force in April 2011 (Amer 2014: 102f).
The ban of the burkini in the summer of 2016 can be understood as one part 
in this long history of laïcité, where the French depreciation or fear of the veil, and 
of Islam, has come to play a more significant role since the end of the cold war. 
The mayors of a number of cities along the Riviera, and on Corsica, individually 
decided against the use of burkini; decisions that are in violation of the French 
law from 2011, since it only bans covering of the face in public. The burkini in its 
common form covers the body and the hair, but not the face, and the law from 
2011 is not – according to France’s highest administrative court, the Conseil d’État 
– applicable on the burkini. The ban has no support in the French constitution or 
legislation, since the law from 2011 only concerns face covering in public. Hence, 
there are no legal arguments or support, and it seems quite clear that it’s the esca-
lating and manicheistic discourse of islamophobia, neo-orientalism and fear of 
terror that has instigated the bans.
From veils to burkinis
A pillar of French colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries has been assimi-
lation. In the French colonial setting it meant that everyone who mastered the 
French language and culture – people within France and its colonies, regardless of 
colour it was argued – were considered French. Nationality could be acquired.4 In 
reality it was not that easy and there were numerous ways to install new differen-
ces, which created a never ending spiral of a Frenchness just out of reach for the 
non-white colonised other (Bhabha 1994 (1987): 86ff). What this non-essentialist 
doctrine did not make explicit, but which has been pointed out by its anticolonial 
critics, was that privileging Frenchness meant erasing the value of all other lang-
uages and cultures within the French empire, since the French colonial ideolo-
gy equated the universal, e.g. civilisation, with modern, French culture (Senghor 
1963; Fanon 1952). Since colonial times this idea of the hierarchy of cultures, or 
even the obscuring of all others, has been the dominant one, although it has been 
severely criticised by anticolonial activists from the colonies, like the Negritude 
thinkers and Algerian freedom fighters (Lundahl 2005; Azar 2001).
Contemporary European debates on veils and veiling, with France as an active 
part, need to be understood within this context of French colonial history (Scott 
2007; Camiscioli 2009; Selby 2012). During French colonial rule, veils served as 
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symbols of both the conservative nature of Algeria, as well as the frustration and 
humiliation of France (Scott 2007: 66). The veil was identified as “the bone of con-
tention” within the battle between France and Algeria (Fanon 1967: 36f). Since the 
principle of secularity was challenged in 1989, when the first efforts to restrict the 
use of veils began in France, it has stirred conflicts and debates, and evoked dif-
ferent kinds of resistance. But as Gillo Pontecorvo shows already in his film from 
1966, The Battle of Algiers, about the French-Algerian war, veils became weapons 
(sometimes they hid messages or guns) used by the FLN (Front de libération na-
tionale) and the resistance movement played on how the French framed Algerian 
women as apolitical – either they wore “traditional”, i.e. veils, or “Western”, i.e. 
“modern feminine” clothes – and they were in both cases assumed to lack politi-
cal agency (Moruzzi 1993; Najmabadi 2006: 252). Or, from the other side, when 
Algerian women in 1958 dropped their veils to proclaim their Frenchness, since 
“a Muslim woman can claim Frenchness only if she is willing to drop her veil in 
public.” (Najmabadi 2006: 252) Veils in France have become the carriers of the 
old colonial relationship to Algeria and the colonial wound opens up again whe-
never veiling is debated. L’Algérie, feminine form in French, unveils itself in order 
to reveal “truths” taken for granted. In “Western”, orientalised conceptions of the 
veil, it is assumed that it veils something, the thing itself, or its absence, and so-
metimes the movement of unveiling is inseparable from an understanding of the 
veil, in that unveiling constitutes the veil as such (Cixous, Derrida, & Benning-
ton 2001: 34). 1989, when the first controversy unfolded, was also the year of the 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and was a breaking point for the emerging conflict 
between “east” (even if the scene was in France, and most of those concerned, 
were descending from Algeria, that is “south”) and the “west”, were connections 
were made between events in Iran, developments in Algeria, Palestine and the 
Algerian-descending population in suburbs as Creil (Amer 2014: 99).
Even if clothing often is absent in discourses on power, that changes as soon 
as dress codes – at least if they relate to the female body and/or her sexuality – 
are broken, or overstepped. Then they become interesting also for the rest of so-
ciety.5 In the summer 2016 many Europeans learned a new word: burkini. “If a 
woman goes swimming in a burkini, that could draw a crowd and disrupt public 
order,” the mayor of Cannes, Mr. Lisnard, explained and continued: “It is preci-
sely to protect these women that I took this decision. The burkini is the uniform 
of extremist Islamism, not of the Muslim religion.” (Breeden & Blaise 2016) The 
reaction was not restricted to local politics. The French Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls also thought it appropriate to explain that the burkini is “not compatible 
with the values of France and the Republic.” (Dickey 2016) Mayors from some 
coastal towns banned the veil with reference both to terrorism and to secularism:
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Beach wear that ostentatiously presents a religious affiliation while 
France and places of worship are now the target of terrorist attacks is 
likely to create the risk of disturbances to public order (mobs, scuffles) 
that it’s necessary to prevent,’ said the bylaw. Therefore, access to be-
aches is prohibited until after Aug. 31 ‘to any person not properly dres-
sed, respectful of morality and secularism’. (Dickey 2016)
Even if these ordinances were later identified as not supported by French law, men 
in power apparently saw this type of clothing as threatening, and some of the may-
ors declared that they would stand by their decisions in opposition to the Conseil 
d’État. How they came to the conclusion that “the burkini is the uniform of extre-
mist Islamism” is hard to understand given that it was developed in Australia to 
enable Muslim girls and women to participate on similar conditions in the beach 
life. During the decade of its existence, the burkini has been seen at beaches or in 
sports all over the world, and it comes in many forms, covering the whole body, 
except face and hands, or significant parts of it.
The term burkini is made up of the two words burqa and bikini. As women’s 
clothing they could be described as the two most extreme outfits women wear in 
public. The traditional burqa intends to hide as much of a woman’s “attributes” 
as possible, whereas the bikini is designed to cover as little as possible in order to 
expose the body/skin to nature, sun, and water, and possibly to the gaze of others. 
The burkini intends to make it easier for women who want to be comfortable at 
the beach without exposing their bodies to the sun or gazes.6 As such, it situates 
itself in between the bikini, which is assumed to give the wearer the ultimate expe-
rience of freedom of the body, and the burqa, which obviously not only hides the 
wearer’s features, but also restricts what one can do while wearing it. The intro-
duction of the burkini facilities the fulfilment of the desire to move freely both on 
land and in water, and yet protecting the body from unwanted gazes – or for that 
matter, ultraviolet rays.
If we recall the formulation from one of the ordinances: “access to beaches is 
prohibited […] to any person not properly dressed, respectful of morality and se-
cularism” we see that now, in 2016, proper dressing has become synonymous with 
(at least at beaches) uncovered bodies.7 Being uncovered has become normal and 
to cover up has become suspicious, signalling danger. With Sara Ahmed one could 
say that the covering up has become a token for being a “stranger” and a stranger 
for her is not the unknown, but that which is known as unknown:
The stranger here is not somebody we do not recognise, but somebody 
that we recognise as a stranger, somebody we know as not knowing, 
rather than somebody we simply do not know. The stranger is produced 
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as an object of knowledge, rather than coming into being in an absence 
of knowledge. (S. Ahmed 2000: 49)
Women in burkinis are treated as strangers, in the sense Ahmed evokes. But they 
are not unknown, they are the strangers that we already know, maybe too well.
Public and safe space?
Who react to veiling? The resistance against veiling is often formulated with refe-
rences to an idea of the free liberal subject, in a free and at times more or less nude 
body, or clad in garments supposedly without religious or political connotations – 
representing the neutral and safe. There is also the desire to describe the veil as an 
object of hatred and a sign for victimhood (Berg & Carbin 2013), where veils – in 
colonial discourses – tend to represent symbols of patriarchal oppression in which 
these women need to be “saved” by Westerners (Spivak 1988).
The ordinance against burkinis states that religious freedom can be curtailed 
for security reasons and does not explicitly mention any particular faith. The may-
or of Cannes, Mr. Lisnard, however, told the newspaper Nice Matin that the ban 
was directed specifically at Muslim attire, even though Cannes officials acknow-
ledge that the number of women who swim in such clothing is “marginal.” (“Nice 
Matin” 2016)
The ordinance was the latest step taken in the name of laïcité targeting Muslim 
clothing, a regular point of contention in France (Daley & Rubin 2015). Politicians 
disagree deeply on how to define laïcité; some acknowledge that it is increasingly 
used to justify measures, which single out Muslims, rather than to keep govern-
ment out of all religion and vice versa, the principle’s original intent (Breeden & 
Blaise 2016). The uniqueness of French laïcité suggests that it has a fixed mea-
ning, but the way it has been used against veiling since the late 1980s indicates 
that it’s more contingent than the discourse usually acknowledges (Calhoun, Juer-
gensmeyer, & VanAntwerpen 2011). It might be argued that what is special is its 
relation to the French state and even to Frenchness in itself and how the French 
imagined community is constituted (Anderson 1991; Latour 1993).
As the French state initiated the ban against veils in 2004, a normalisation of 
non-veiling became institutionalised and the public sphere turned into neutral 
spaces for some bodies but not for others. In this context the persona Princess Hi-
jab was created by an anonymous street artist in France, a persona who intervened 
in the crossfire of democracy, religion, secularity and consumer capitalism with 
the veil as subject. In guerrilla art, artists are often anonymous as the art is often 
illegal and offers alternative visual narratives outside the commercial sphere. The 
artist behind the character named Princess Hijab is not known and uses this po-
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sition for artistic purposes. Several discussions have focused on whether the artist 
is a woman and/or a Muslim (Esseghaier 2013). By using veiling as a charged act 
in a French context, the artistic expressions “un-safe” the imagined neutral space. 
In an interview by Wooster Collective, Princess Hijab relates the expression to fear 
and safety: “I chose the veil because it does what art should do. It challenges, it 
frightens, and it re-imagines” (Wooster Collective 2009).
The underground as a crowded place is supposed to be public and secure; 
hence with guerrilla art, things taken for granted and perceptions of space are 
made part of a dialogue. The artist points to what the viewer may not have seen, 
asking for a response. For example, an open place experienced as neutral and safe 
for some, are alienating and sometimes frightening for others. To cover oneself 
can be a way to protect yourself from the eyes of others and hence, in a French 
context covering rather than uncovering can be viewed as demanding rather than 
modest. Public transport is one possible place where irregular immigrants can be 
caught, identified as Other via their clothing.
The artist shows an awareness of the many varied connotations of the veil, and 
perhaps the multiplicity of identities and opinions related to it, and that is what 
keeps the artist from aligning with any one group or an explicit political message 
(see video interview in Al Jazeera). Hence by the different expressions and inter-
views she can be defined as an insider or an outsider, but most of all disturbing the 
public’s urge for a clear line between the speaker and spoken.
The hijabisation of “uncovered” bodies can be interpreted as pointing to the 
paradox that veiled women are viewed as submissive at the same time as female 
nudity is normalised in and through everyday advertising. In Princess Hijab’s ma-
nifesto she unpacks the racist message of modern beauty brands as L’Oréal and 
Dark & Lovely.8 The two brands in question have strong symbolic value; the for-
mer since it has been sued in France for racial discrimination and the latter for 
its hair-straightening cream, which is becoming increasingly controversial due to 
its reinforcing the “white” norm of straight hair, and the protests coming from 
movements that celebrate “natural hair” (Bird 2009). The artist seems to choose 
objects carefully and uses consumer imagery to create statements about political 
exclusion and images of normativity, while mirroring the apolitical nature of the 
imagery in a refusal of explicit politics (Hirdman 2001).
Street art has often been viewed as a movement with a democratic motif; a 
claim to space, a reminder to people of the possibility of making it theirs (McAu-
liffe 2012). The streets and squares do not belong to the leaders of this community, 
country, the world – it belongs to everyone in these spaces (McAuliffe & Iveson 
2011). Although street art sometimes has mainly artistic purposes and the rea-
son behind it varies, the street artist often seeks to give meaning to a space and 
communicate messages. The communication is directed towards the users of the 
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place in question, with the possibility of turning hegemonic room-making into an 
alternative public space, or with Jeffrey Hou, professor in architecture and public 
art, insurgent public space.
Because of the scale and the mode of production, the making of this 
alternative public space is more participatory and spontaneous, and 
therefore more open and inclusive. The insurgent public space that they 
have created is therefore both a smaller and a grander public space. 
(Hou 2010: 15)
Veiling have been used to discuss the bodily rights and, through art, highlight and 
denaturalise secular norms, something which is also the case with the art of Prin-
cess Hijab (Atluri 2017: 182). With a black marker pen the artist included veils in 
the artwork, starting in 2006 after the ban of headscarves in 2004 and before the 
following burqa-ban in 2011. The artworks can be read as resistance, which con-
fronts and displays the specific French fear of veils and Islam. In an interview for 
the Guardian she points to Naomi Klein’s No Logo (Klein 2000) as one source of 
inspiration:
I’d been working on veils, making spandex outfits that enveloped bodi-
es, more classic art than fashion. And I’d been drawing veiled women 
on skate-boards and other graphic pieces, when I felt I wanted to con-
front the outside world. I’d read Naomi Klein’s No Logo and it inspired 
me to risk intervening in public places, targeting advertising. (Chrisafis 
2010)
Metro systems in general tend to be protective about their advertising space, so 
the work of Princess Hijab usually only stayed up for about an hour before it was 
torn down again. As a result, very few people have seen the actual interventions, 
but they are well documented in photographs, which have been widely spread on-
line. Princess Hijab wrote a manifesto on a webpage for the character in question 
with an archive of pictures. Together with the artist strategies and the extensive 
and abundant spread, the artistic interventions have a continuing afterlife online. 
The images have been discussed and Princess Hijab has been called both a femi-
nist and an anti-feminist, racist as well as pro-multiculturalist. In many ways this 
reflects how the veil has become a symbol that mobilises as well as divide different 
ideological positions on feminism and racism. Of course this also relates to the 
speculations on who is behind the artwork. The question of whether or not Prin-
cess Hijab belongs to a certain ideological position, raises questions about who 
has the right to define problems and solutions as well as the on-going homogeni-
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sation on what veils really “are”. In interviews the artist says she is interested in the 
veil since it
has many hidden meanings, it can be as profane as it is sacred, consu-
merist and sanctimonious. From Arabic Gothicism to the condition 
of man. The interpretations are numerous and of course it carries 
great symbolism on race, sexuality and real and imagined geography. 
(Chrisafis 2010)
Even though she does not explicitly identify with a specific community, she some-
times labels her work as part of a “graffiti of minorities” that reclaims the street. 
Whether or not these “hijabisations” are directed toward bans against veils, and 
raise questions on who is considered to be represented and feel safe in public spa-
ce, these questions inevitably follow as an effect of the interventions. And, as Prin-
cess Hijab puts it, the veil “challenges, it frightens, and it re-imagines”. But who 
reacts by being scared, provoked and maybe even feeling unsafe by veils or street 
art in public space of Paris?
This evidently raises issues about safety and unsafety. What can be defined as 
a safe space, and who are included in such a space? The concept is in itself connec-
ted to a feminist, antiracist and queer activist tradition where safe spaces someti-
mes have been called for (Hanhardt 2013). In the case of the burkini ban – for the 
safety of sunbathers – and public transport with everyday advertising, safe space 
becomes something urgent. With the threat of terror growing stronger after the 
terror attacks in Nice and in Paris, it has of course a very literal and direct mea-
ning. But there is also quite specific violence and threats directed towards queer 
people, veiled women, and racialised people in Europe, which makes the demands 
for safe spaces very concrete. Hence those who are voicing the demands for safety 
are usually not the most vulnerable, and freedom of speech becomes the mantra 
for a certain kind of (liberal) freedom.
Boundaries of liberal freedom
In Princess Hijab’s ad busting art veils are not used mainly to veil, to hide so-
mething from the gaze of the public, even if it does that as well. Rather, they are 
used to uncover and show the world the white, patriarchal commercial industry 
(Esseghaier 2013). Drawing black niqabs on advertisements becomes a performa-
tive act commenting on consumerism, religion, secularity, and the imagined Mus-
lim woman. Hijabisation becomes a challenging and political act in the French 
cultural context, where the burqa and the niqab are seen as symbols of Otherness 
from the past to the present.
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Princess Hijab’s art articulates connections between myths of femininity and 
citizenship in works that mirror global contestations of consumerism, and by wor-
king within this specific context, she targets the similarities between secularism 
and feminism in consumer culture rather than subverting the hypocrisy of global 
corporations (Humphrey 2012). The veiled body becomes unseen, unreachable 
and with its mythic connotations of the Orient, it is reiterated as unknown and 
potentially dangerous. The almost naked models are turned into normalised re-
presentations of people – primarily women – in the city, and, thereby the (pain-
ted) veiled model turns into the deviant. Hence, as the white body is hijabised it 
also becomes flesh, a body seen in its bare apparition.
Drawing black veils on fashion advertisements in the Paris metro is not only 
telling us something about veils. Veils are transformed into tools against a certain 
type of industry but they also act as symbols for reclaiming democracy, and func-
tion as a way to politicise the apolitical. All of the works have a clear distinction 
between what is the ad and what is the intervention. The black ink often runs, and 
the pen creates a surface that differs significantly from the exclusive fashion prints. 
The image is obviously made as a personal unique initiative and not as one copy of 
thousands of images made by someone anonymous for a famous company. Via the 
quick artistic expression, the de-personalised communication becomes visible. 
As a contrast to messages from something unknown, Princess Hijab’s drawings 
become a call for attention. The drawings become individualised and uncomfor-
table; at the same time they point at collective problems, regarding ownership and 
agency of the female body, the power over public space and burning questions of 
conviviality.
As a comparison, veiled women on the streets, at beaches – in burkini or other 
hijabs – hijab in the meaning modest cover (Amer 2014: 13f) become politicised, 
often reluctantly, even if their choice to veil is often personal. But their reasons to 
why they hijab, veil cannot be heard (Spivak 1988) and they are forced into belon-
ging to one-dimensional “Muslim” communities, which are not imagined from 
inside but from the outside (Anderson 1991) and are attributed certain values and 
ideas, which are difficult to resist or reject, if one does not reject Islam altogether. 
However, we are not claiming to let the subaltern speak in this text, but rather, in 
line with the phenomena we are studying – especially the interventions of Prin-
cess Hijab – we see an on going need to comment and challenge hegemonic norms 
and raise questions concerning who has the right to exist and who has the need to 
learn to unlearn.
The French law prohibiting hiding of the face, safeguards the right for women 
to appear unveiled and denies the right for women to appear according to reli-
gious norms of their choice. In this sense, the act of forcing women to religious 
disaffiliation installs the public sphere as negating imagined forms of belonging 
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(Butler 2015: 81). Communities of belonging (whether they are chosen or forced 
upon its members) based on certain kinds of religious affiliations are in this sense 
violently denied. The events of the summer of 2016 at the beaches of France de-
monstrates how the so-called public sphere, in this French context, is constructed 
on foundational exclusions in line with ostracism. The message about the “free-
dom to appear” becomes a brutal act to appear according to dominant norms or 
simply disappear.
The commercial actors are free to invade our space with selected choices, a 
freedom they purchase. Princess Hijab grabs this freedom, probably at great risk, 
to show us something else, but her message remains marginal, a marginal com-
ment; it does not claim to be hegemonic or normative. Naked bodies – especially if 
they are female – are here portrayed as a token of freedom (but whose freedom?), 
whereas covered, hijabised bodies are assumed to be unfree. Burkini-gate showed 
us another story. The four policemen who tried to unveil a peacefully resting wo-
man on the beach of Cannes will stay in our memories as a strong reminder of 
who is forcing whom to what. It shows us that the freedom to be covered is thre-
atened, and nudity is forced. Freedom is conditioned, and needs to be exercised 
within specific boundaries. Burkini-gate was a negotiation of these boundaries: 
“can we agree that on beaches everybody must show skin?” For now the Supreme 
Court says no, but local politicians claim that they will go on. Princess Hijab is 
also an engagement in similar conversations; her art questions current boundaries 
of freedom: whose freedom to appear and how? This challenges what we mean 
when we talk about freedom, and Aheda Zanetti, the designer of the first burkini, 
argues that: “The burkini stands for freedom, flexibility and confidence, it does 
not stand for misery, torture and terror” (Dumas 2016).
Whose (failed) integration
Veiling is often seen as a token of otherness, an otherness that cannot be accom-
modated within a modern Western state. An alternative view, however, would be 
to see hijabisation as something in between, as an invention from Muslim com-
munities to be able to – on their own conditions, as Muslims – participate in 
modern life – as themselves, on their own conditions, which is what the burkini 
aimed to accomplish. According to Aheda Zanetti, the designer of the first bur-
kini, the Muslims felt integrated when the burkini was accepted in the Western 
world (Dumas 2016). The burkini has had this integrating effect since a number of 
non-Muslim women have embraced the burkini as well as their chosen beachwear, 
both before Burkini-gate, but reportedly also during it (Pearlman 2016), which is 
reflected in Zanetti’s selling rates: “Every time anyone says something bad about 
the burkini, I get enquires and sales out of it” (Dumas 2016).
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The burkini was developed to answer the need for Muslim women to both co-
ver their bodies and to participate in modern beach life. Beaches have been used 
by people all over the world for different activities, but swimming as a common 
activity is quite recent, as is Western swimwear. Western swimwear has followed 
the development of the 20th century to develop clothes less ruled by decorum, 
and partly formed by the increased sexualising of especially the female body. Not 
only the sexualised, also the abled body, the fit body, is celebrated by mainstream 
beachwear. Aspects that might have grown since the actual need of a strong body 
has declined in the Western middle class, and therefore – just as cultural pheno-
mena that once were important for daily life tend to become displayed at muse-
ums when they are not really needed – has become something to demonstrate and 
show off rather than to actually use.
Judith Butler (2015) talks about mobilising bodies in space, and the impor-
tance of seeing the responsiveness of everyone. So what could this be? We see a 
parallel to making personal expressions in public space, arguing for bodily assem-
blages, for uncertain efforts to make alliances between different bodies. In line 
with Butler we want to emphasise the crucial dimension of people always trying to 
embody and politicise place. When male, secular, Western bodies use their right 
to speak and be seen in the public there is almost an invisible link, a direct con-
nection between private and public. If women from minority groups use “freedom 
of speech” and the right to appear, it becomes an overt political action. To demand 
the right to speech, and to inhabit a public arena depend to a high degree on ac-
cess to power and possible subject positions. Already in 2006 Afsaneh Najmabadi 
stated that there is a gap between the loud protests against veils in public and the 
care for women’s real inclusion:
Muslim women who stay in their “cloistered homes” hardly pose a vi-
sible challenge to French […] secularism. It is, rather, those Muslim 
women who insist on making their presence seen in public, in educa-
tional and professional sites and public spaces, who present a spectacle 
of strangeness […] the French state, in effect, has chosen to insist that a 
Muslim woman’s veil singularly means an undermining of Frenchness 
and its secular character, and that it singularly means Muslim woman’s 
oppression. (Najmabadi 2006: 252f)
When minorized people use the classical tools of freedom they are destabilising 
the safety of the space – that is, their actions demonstrate how conditioned those 
tools are, that they require users that conform to norms. Or as Princess Hijab 
describes it:
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My art is rooted in a thinking process and posture which fight socie-
ty’s codes and conventions. It’s since touched upon more global issues 
(anti-advertisement campaigns, state-secularism and religion), but my 
work will always be a game between myself and my city. Princess Hi-
jab has the clothes and the directness of an Adbuster. She reminds us 
of the excesses and the failures of our consumer society, but there is 
no attempt at utopianism … I am simply aware that a paradigm shift is 
needed. (Payne 2009)9
The intervention of drawing black hijabs over white bodies by a character named 
Princess Hijab, call for the spaces in-between given subject positions, a displace-
ment of the hegemonic colonial narration of structure as well as practice (Bhabha 
1994, 1996). By contrasting the glossy commercial imagery and the rough painted 
black ink, with the metaphorical hijab-dressing on pale naked western ideals – a 
hybrid strategy opens up a third space for rearticulation of negotiation and mea-
ning (Bhabha 1996).
By following different examples of un/veiling, a nationalist fantasy intertwi-
ned with the idea of the secular state demonstrates itself (Fernando 2014). Hija-
bisation and burkini-use ultimately become decolonial interventions and signs of 
integration revealing an imperialist paradigm; seemingly marginal actions, which 
can be viewed as examples of negotiations and struggles about public areas and, in 
the long run, what is and should be the common.
Both our examples confirm that hijabising – through wearing burkinis or per-
forming street art – represent diversity within the community of Muslim women. 
They both challenge the current French hegemony, which puts secularity in the 
center as an important tool to secure the common in a modern democratic society 
while at the same time differences of class, gender, region and race do not fit well 
into the idea of what the “community of shared values” in France is assumed to be 
(Asad 2006: 14).
Given France’s long and partly violent colonial history, it is disturbing to hear 
how the French public is still trapped in what one early critic of French colonial 
power called “superiority complex” (Senghor 1963). We find it important to fur-
ther discuss the aftermath and continuing effects of “European culture and know-
ledge” by identifying resistance and transformation of the injustices to which di-
sempowered peoples and societies remain subjected (Young 2001: 68).
In her introduction to Is Critique Secular? Wendy Brown points out that if 
race had been a part of the Danish Muhammad cartoons, they would likely have 
been illegal in many European contexts (Asad, Brown, Butler, & Mahmood 2013: 
11). Her point is that through a different language, described as tacit, silent or im-
plicit race thinking, it becomes possible within the law and the liberal discourse, 
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to still talk about the “Muslim”. But not about the Arab, for example, or about the 
Middle East, or other regions’ cultures or about different races and their assumed 
internal differences. The content from racism has moved to other categories like 
ethnicity, culture, tradition, and religion. Within the law and the current French 
hegemony it’s possible to enforce pork meals in school (Fraser 2015), de-veil wo-
men on beaches, publish offensive Mohammad cartoons, etcetera, i.e. continue to 
harass Muslims in the name of culture, yet avoiding explicit racialising.
Race thinking might be gone from most explicit discourses but was absolutely 
normal when most of the thinking that we proudly see as defining us – moderni-
ty, secularity, democracy, human rights –was articulated. This makes it not only 
possible but likely that there are implicit traces of race thinking in most of the 
heritage from the Enlightenment, and we cannot assume that it is enough to erase 
the explicit references to race (and sex, class, sexuality, religion, etcetera) to free an 
idea from this heritage (Eze 1997).
The capacity of secularity to function as a prerequisite for modernity, critique 
and reason, and the fact that it does not see itself (or is seen) as political, ideologi-
cal or historical is harmful for a reciprocal integration. We need to see secularism 
as the particular and local position that it is, and as one of many ways of under-
standing and framing the world. And it is pertinent for the future that we who are 
disciplined into the secular paradigm become aware of our own framings, and 
how they shape our worldview (Casanova 1994; Asad 2003; Calhoun et al. 2011).
One of our times’ challenges is to scrutinise given values for Eurocentric, pa-
triarchal heritage, which includes the idea that religion and secularity are entirely 
separable, and the idea that the secular should be the most rational way to orga-
nise society, and instead begin to build societies where secularism is one of many 
possible positions, that many still see as the best for them, but not necessarily as 
the best for everyone. There is a need to rethink the idea of secularity as something 
that everyone eventually needs to embrace, as well as to stop seeing secularism as 
the only position that can accommodate critique, modernity, and the existence of 
a public sphere and an engaged civil society.
These questions emphasize an observation that is becoming increasing-
ly commonplace: the rise of religious ‘fundamentalisms’, the spread of 
nationalist movements, the redefinitions of claims to race and ethnicity, 
it is claimed, have returned us to an earlier historical movement, a re-
surgence or restaging of what historians have called the long nineteenth 
century. Underlying this claim is a deeper unease, a fear that the engi-
ne of social transformation is no longer the aspiration to a democratic 
common culture. We have entered an anxious age of identity, in which 
the attempt to memorialize lost time, and to reclaim lost territories, cre-
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ates a culture of disparate ‘interest groups’ or social movements. Here 
affiliation may be antagonistic and ambivalent; solidarity may be only 
situational and strategic: commonality is often negotiated through the 
‘contingency’ of social interests and political claims. (Bhabha 1996: 
58)
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Notes
1 There is a sura in the Quran often referred to as the “the verse of the hijab”, Q 33:53, 
in which men are asked to only interact with the wives of the prophet from behind a 
curtain or a screen, in order for everyone to keep their hearts clean. From that idea 
of a physical border between men and women the practice of hijabising has emerged. 
There is another sura, Q 33: 59, which urges women to draw their veils closer around 
them. Other than that there are no specific rules about veils or hijabs in the Quran 
(Amer 2014: 22ff). From these verses one can talk about hijabisation as the act of 
veiling rather than being about the veil or hijab itself, which is not mentioned or des-
cribed in the Quran.
2 The quotation is taken from an email interview by ethnologist Jenny Gunnarsson 
Payne (2009). We have also been in contact with the artist called Princess Hijab. In all 
interviews this female character is in focus and in all public information the gender 
of this persona is labelled she, therefore we have chosen to use female singular when 
discussing the artwork by Princess Hijab.
3 There is a growing body of scholarly work on Muslims, and especially female Mus-
lims, and their place in public France. For example: L. Ahmed 1992; Fernando 2010; 
Bowen 2007; Deltombe 2005; Silverstein 2004; Keaton 2006.
4 For a long time the practice of jus soli, birth right citizenship, was practiced in Fran-
ce, but it has been restricted since the 1990s (Brubaker 1992: 150f).
5 Uniforms and suits are although standard requisites in the corridors of power and an 
important part of constructions of heteronormative (not to say hegemonic) masculi-
nity (Connell 1987: 79ff).
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6 The burkini has been branded as “Muslim”, even though the designer Aheda Za-
netti claims that she did not only think of Muslim women when she designed it 
(Zanetti 2016). The British food celebrity Nigella Lawson made headlines when 
she wore one in 2011 (Bunting 2011). Apparently many non-Muslim women have 
bought one after it became a legal issue in France as an act of solidarity (Khan 2016).
7 Swimming and sunbathing became a part of Western upper classes’ recreational 
and leisure life during the late 19th and early 20th century, and it was not until the 
late 1920s that it become fashionable with tanned skin, and the now normative biki-
ni was introduced as late as 1946 (Martin et al. 2009).
8 In a now erased “manifesto” from her blog she wrote that “Princess Hijab knows 
that L’Oréal and Dark & Lovely have been killing her little by little,” (Gordon 2009; 
Cabein 2009).
9 Italics by authors.
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